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Abstract. In this paper we consider a nonlinear discrete-time dynamic
model proposed by Farris et al. in the paper “When five is a crowd in the
market share attraction model: the dynamic stability of competition” Journal
of Research and Management, (2005), as a market share attraction model
with two firms that decide marketing efforts over time according to best reply
strategies with na¨ıve expectations. The model also considers an adaptive
adjustment towards best reply, a form of inertia or anchoring attitude, and
we investigate the effects of heterogeneities among firms. A rich scenario
of local and global bifurcations is obtained even with just two competing
firms, and a comparison is proposed with apparently similar duopoly models
based on repeated best reply dynamics with na¨ıve expectations and adaptive
adjustment.
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1. Introduction
An important stream in the literature on dynamic models in marketing
is based on market share attraction models, where several firms selling the
same good (or more generally homogeneous goods) are competing in a mar-
ket with a given sales potential, and each firm has to decide its marketing
effort in order to maximize (or at least increase) its market share (see e.g.
[3], [9], [11], [4], [15]). In this paper we consider the discrete-time dynamic
model proposed by Farris et al. [15] where, at each time step t, in order to
decide their marketing effort at time t + 1, the firms solve an optimization
problem to maximize their expected profits. However, their information set
is limited as they do not know the effort decisions of their competitors and
their are assumed to adopt na¨ıve expectations about competitors’ choices,
i.e. they guess that marketing efforts will be the same as in the current
period. The resulting model, denoted as Best Response with na¨ıve expecta-
tions, is well known in the literature since the pioneering work of Cournot
(1838) on mathematical modelling of oligopolies (see [12] or any standard
textbook on oligopoly modelling). As suggested in [15], as well as by sev-
eral other authors, see e.g. [23], [7], the awareness of the systematic error
in the assumption of na¨ıve expectations, as well as the difficulties to change
the marketing policy, may induce the firms to adopt a compromise (a con-
vex combination) between the computed best response and the previously
adopted efforts, a form of inertia or anchoring attitude. This leads to the
adaptive adjustment model considered in this paper. The analysis of this
model given in [15] is mainly focused on the case of n homogeneous firms,
i.e. characterized by identical parameters, in order to study the relation be-
tween market stability and the number of firms, by taking the number n of
firms as a bifurcation parameter in a one-dimensional model that summa-
rizes the common behaviour of the identical firms. In this paper we follow a
complementary approach, in the sense that we consider just two firms com-
peting in the same market and we stress the effects of heterogeneities, i.e.
how the differences between the parameters, that characterize the dynamic
behaviour of the two firms, influence the equilibrium points, their stability
and bifurcations, as well as the global dynamic scenarios of the model. A
first step has been made towards this direction in the recent paper [8], where
the effects of small heterogeneities have been investigated starting from the
one-dimensional model analyzed in [15]. However, the rich spectrum of dy-
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namic behaviors that the two-dimensional discrete-time model exhibits un-
der different parameters’ constellations is worth to be further investigated,
in particular in regions of parameters’ space where heterogeneity between
the two firms may play an important role. Analytical results can be easily
proved for the model obtained under assumptions of some (not all) identical
parameters. Moreover, even if numerical explorations are necessary in order
to investigate the global properties of the model with arbitrary parameters’
values, some general statements can still be given and may stimulate further
studies concerning both the economic and the mathematical properties of
the model.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 the economic model is
described and it is written in the form of two-dimensional map with a simple
mathematical structure. In Section 3 existence and stability of equilibrium
points is proved for the case with identical efforts’ effectiveness and different
inertia of firms, and some numerical simulations are given to confirm and
extend the analytical results. In Section 4 a complete analytical study of the
existence of equilibrium points is given for arbitrary values of the parameters,
and some numerical simulations are provided in order to characterize the
role of marketing efforts on the dynamic properties of the model. Section 5
concludes.
2. The model
Let us consider n firms that sell homogeneous goods in a market with
sales potential B (in terms of overall customers’ market expenditures, also
denoted as market contribution MC by some authors, see e.g. [15]), and
let Ai(t), i = 1, ..., n, denote the attraction of customers to firm i at time
period t, where t ∈ N denotes an event-driven discrete time variable. The
key assumption in marketing literature is that the market share for firm i at
time t is given by
si(t) =
Ai(t)∑n
j=1Aj(t)
(1)
If xi denotes marketing spending of firm i, following [11], see also [15], we
assume that attraction is given by
Ai = aix
βi
i
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where the positive constants ai denote the relative effectiveness of effort ex-
pended by the firm i and the parameter βi denote the elasticity of the attrac-
tion of firm (or brand) i with regard to the marketing effort, as dAi
dxi
xi
Ai
= βi.
On the basis of these assumptions, the one-period net profit of firm i is given
by
Πi(t) = Bsi(t)− xi(t) = B aix
βi
i (t)
aix
βi
i (t) +
∑
j 6=i ajx
βj
j (t)
− xi(t) (2)
In [15] the case of unit elasticities βi = 1, i = 1, ..., n, is considered and at
each time t agents are assumed to decide next period spending xi(t + 1) by
solving the optimization problem
max
xi
Π
(e)
i (t+ 1) = max
xi
(
B
aixi
aixi +
∑
j 6=i ajx
(e)
j (t+ 1)
− xi
)
where Π
(e)
i (t+ 1) is the expected profit at time t+ 1 and x
(e)
j (t+ 1) represent
the expectation of firm i about firm j spending at time t + 1 on the basis
of the information set of firm i at time t. From the first order conditions
∂Πi(t+1)
∂xi
= 0, one gets
xi(t+ 1) =
√
B
∑
j 6=i ajx
(e)
j (t+ 1)
ai
−
∑
j 6=i
ajx
(e)
j (t+ 1)
Assuming na¨ıve expectations
x
(e)
j (t+ 1) = xi(t)
the following dynamic model is obtained
xi(t+ 1) = Ri
(∑
j 6=i
ajxj(t)
)
=
√
B
∑
j 6=i ajxj(t)
ai
−
∑
j 6=i
ajxj(t) (3)
usually denoted as “Best Response” with na¨ıve expectations. Notice that the
parameter B is just a scale parameter, that has no influence on the dynamic
properties of the model. So, without loss of generality we shall consider
B = 1 in the following.
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In [15] also a different adjustment process is proposed, known as adaptive
adjustment towards best reply, see also [23], [19], [7], given by
xi(t+ 1) = (1− λi)xi(t) + λiRi
(∑
j 6=i
ajxj(t)
)
i = 1, ..., n (4)
where the constants λi ∈ [0, 1] represent the attitude of firm i to adopt
the best reply, whereas (1− λi) is the anchoring attitude to maintain the
previous spending decision, i.e. a measure of firms’ inertia to modify their
marketing efforts. The model (4) is a generalization of (3) because it reduces
to it for λi = 1, i = 1, ..., n, whereas it tends to complete inertia of firm i,
i.e. xi(t + 1) = xi(t), as λi → 0. It is straightforward to see that for λi 6= 0,
i = 1, ...n, the model with inertia (4) has the same equilibrium points as
the model (3). These equilibrium points, being located at the intersections
between the two best response functions (3), are Nash equilibria. However
the presence of inertia influences their stability properties.
In the following we consider the case of two firms, n = 2, with the dynamic
variables rescaled as
x = a1a2x1 ; y = a1a2x2 (5)
so that the dynamic model studied in this paper assumes the form of the
map T : (x, y)→ (x′, y′) with
T :
{
x′ = (1− λ1)x+ a2λ1
(√
y − y)
y′ = (1− λ2)y + a1λ2 (
√
x− x) (6)
where ′ denotes the unit-time advancement operator, that is, if the right-hand
side variables are productions of period t then the left-hand ones represent
productions of period (t+ 1).
The map (6) is defined for nonnegative values of x and y. Starting from a
given initial condition (x0, y0) ∈ R2+ , where R2+ = {(x, y) ∈ R2|x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0}
denotes the set of nonnegative state variables, the iteration of (6) generates
an infinite sequence of states, or a trajectory{
(xt, yt) = T
t(x0, y0), t = 1, 2, ...
}
(7)
provided that (x0, y0), as well as all its images T
t(x0, y0) of any rank t, belong
to R2+. If ai ≤ 4, i = 1, 2, then the square S = [0, 1] × [0, 1] is a trapping
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region, i.e. trajectories starting inside S remain in it for each t ≥ 0. However,
feasible (i.e. non-interrupted) trajectories can be even obtained for ai > 4
provided that λjai ≤ 4, i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, but this depends on
the initial condition, i.e. in this case trajectories starting inside S may be
interrupted because of negative values of a dynamic variable. In the following
we shall denote unfeasible region the set of points that generate interrupted
trajectories and the considered initial conditions will be taken outside such
region.
A similar dynamic model has been proposed as a Cournot duopoly model
with isoelastic demand and linear cost functions in [23] (see Appendix for
details where we show that the duopoly model reduces to the present model
for a1a2 = 1), see also [1] and [2] for a deeper local and global dynamic
analysis of such duopoly model. However, despite such apparently similar
form of the map, the dynamic properties of the marketing model (6) reveal
to be quite different (we may say even surprisingly different) with respect
to the duopoly Cournot model with inertia proposed in [23]. In fact, as
shown in the Appendix (see also [23], [1], [2]) such duopoly model has only
one nontrivial equilibrium point that may lose stability via a Neimark-Sacker
bifurcation, whereas the marketing model (6), as we shall see in the following,
may have more than one equilibrium, and different kinds of bifurcations can
be observed, such as pitchfork, flip or saddle node bifurcations.
For λi 6= 0 the fixed points of the map (6), obtained by imposing the
conditions x′ = x and y′ = y, are the real and non-negative solutions of the
algebraic system
x = a2
(√
y − y)
y = a1 (
√
x− x) (8)
It is straightforward to see that E0 = (0, 0) is always a fixed point and a
further real positive solution of (8) always exists, say E1 = (x1, y1) with
x1 ∈ (0, 1) and y1 ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, as we shall prove in the following,
a couple of real positive solutions, say E2 = (x2, y2) and E3 = (x3, y3) may
exist according to the parameters’ values a1 and a2.
Let us notice that, from (2) with the new variables (5) and unit elasticities
βi = 1, the profits assume the form
Π1(x, y) =
a1x
a1x+ a2y
− x
a1a2
; Π2(x, y) =
a2y
a1x+ a2y
− y
a1a2
(9)
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and after some trivial algebra the inequality Π1 > Π2 becomes
G(x, y) = a1x
2 + (a2 − a1)xy − a2y2 − a21a2x+ a1a22y < 0 (10)
hence the isoprofit curve G(x, y) = 0 is an hyperbola with symmetry center
(xc, yc) =
(
a1a22(3a1−a2)
(a1+a2)
2 ,
a21a2(3a2−a1)
(a1+a2)
2
)
and asymptotes of slopes a2 and −a1
respectively. As we shall see, the asymmetric dynamics of the dynamical
system (6) may converge to different attractors. According to the region in
which such attractors are included one or the other firm may gain higher
profits. When several different attractors coexist this crucially depends on
initial conditions, so a study of the global structure of the basins of attraction
gives information about the firm that prevail in the market, in the sense of
gaining higher profits.
Before starting to analyze the local and global dynamic properties of the
map (6) it is worth to notice that it is a noninvertible map, because if we
compute (x, y) in terms of a given (x′, y′) by solving the system (6) we can
get up to four real solutions. i.e. a point can have several rank-1 preimages.
Geometrically, the action of a noninvertible map can be expressed by saying
that it folds and pleats” the phase space, because distinct points are mapped
into the same point. This is equivalently stated by saying that several inverses
are defined that unfold” the phase space. For a noninvertible map, the phase
space can be subdivided into regions Zk, k ≥ 0, whose points have k distinct
rank-1 preimages (see e.g. [22]). Generally, for a continuous map, as the
point x′ varies in R2, pairs of preimages appear or disappear as it crosses
the boundaries separating different regions. Such boundaries, denoted as
LC (from the French Ligne Critique”) are defined as sets of points with two
merging preimages, located on LC−1 (following the notations of [18], [22]).
For a differentiable noninvertible map of the plane, the set LC−1 is the set
where the Jacobian determinant vanishes:
LC−1 =
{
(x, y) ∈ R2| detJ = 0} (11)
(see again [18], [22]) where, in our case,
J(x, y) =
 1− λ1 λ1a2
(
1
2
√
y
− 1
)
λ2a1
(
1
2
√
x
− 1
)
1− λ2
 (12)
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So, we get the following equation for LC−1(
1
2
√
x
− 1
)(
1
2
√
y
− 1
)
=
(1− λ1) (1− λ2)
a1a2λ1λ2
(13)
formed by the union of two disjoint branches, say LC−1 = LC
(a)
−1 ∪ LC(b)−1.
Also LC = T (LC−1) is the union of two branches: LC(a) = T (LC
(a)
−1 ) and
LC(b) = T (LC
(b)
−1). The branch LC
(a) separates the regions Z0, whose points
have no preimages, from the region Z2, whose points have two distinct rank-1
preimages. The other branch, LC(b), separates the region Z2 from Z4, whose
points have four distinct preimages.
3. The case a1 = a2
In this section we consider the case of identical effort effectiveness
a1 = a2 = a (14)
so that the firms can only differ with respect to their inertia, expressed by
the parameters λ1 and λ2. Under this assumption the system (8) can be
analytically solved, and besides E0 the following fixed points are obtained:
E1 =
(
a2
(1 + a)2
,
a2
(1 + a)2
)
located on the diagonal ∆ = {(x, y) ∈ R2|x = y}, and for a ≥ 3 two further
fixed points in symmetric positions with respect to ∆
E2 =
a2
2 (a− 1)2 (a+ 1)
(
a− 1 +
√
(a+ 1) (a− 3), a− 1−
√
(a+ 1) (a− 3)
)
E3 =
a2
2 (a− 1)2 (a+ 1)
(
a− 1−
√
(a+ 1) (a− 3), a− 1 +
√
(a+ 1) (a− 3)
)
The local stability of the fixed points is described by the following statement:
Proposition 1. The fixed point E1 ∈ ∆ is locally asymptotically stable
for a < ap = 3. At a = ap a pitchfork bifurcation occurs at which the two fixed
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points E2 and E3 are created and are stable nodes just after the bifurcation.
The fixed point E1 ∈ ∆ also undergoes a flip bifurcation at a = af ≥ 3, being
af = 1 + 2
√
1 + 2
2− λ1 − λ2
λ1λ2
(15)
at which a cycle of period 2 is created along ∆. For a > ah, with
ah = 1 +
3
√√√√
2
(
1
λ1
+
1
λ2
)
+ 2
√(
1
λ1
+
1
λ2
)2
− 16
27
+
+
3
√√√√
2
(
1
λ1
+
1
λ2
)
− 2
√(
1
λ1
+
1
λ2
)2
− 16
27
(16)
the two fixed points E2 and E3 lose stability via a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation.
Proof. The Jacobian matrix (12), with a1 = a2 = a, computed at the
fixed point E1 becomes
J(E1) =
 1− λ1 λ1 1− a2
λ2
1− a
2
1− λ2

From the characteristic equation
P (z) = z2 − Tr · z +Det = 0 ,
where Tr = 2 − λ1 − λ2 and Det = (1− λ1) (1− λ2) − λ1λ2 (1− a)2 /4 are
the trace and the determinant of J(E1) respectively, a sufficient condition
for the stability is expressed by the following system of inequalities (known
as Schur or Jury’s conditions, see e.g. [16], [14], [21])
P (1) = 1− Tr +Det > 0
P (−1) = 1 + Tr +Det > 0 (17)
1−Det > 0
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which are equivalent to state that the two eigenvalues are located inside the
unit circle of the complex plane. In our case
P (1) = λ1λ2
(
1− (1− a)
2
4
)
> 0 for a < 3
P (−1) > 0 for a < af
1−Det = λ1 + λ2 − λ1λ2 + λ1λ2 (1− a)
2
4
> 0 ∀a, λi ∈ [0, 1]
where
af = 1 + 2
√
1 + 2
2− λ1 − λ2
λ1λ2
For a > 3, the Jacobian matrix (12) computed at the two symmetric fixed
points E2 = (x2, y2) and E3 = (y2, x2) is the same, and has has complex
conjugate eigenvalues
z1,2 =
1
2
(2− λ1 − λ2)±
√
(λ1 − λ2)2 + λ1λ2 (−a3 + 3a2 + a+ 1)
hence they are on the unit circle for a = ah at which det(J(E2)) = z1z2 =
|z1|2 = 1, and exit the unit circle, i.e. z1z2 = |z1|2 > 1, for a > ah. This
completes the proof. 
Notice that af = ap = 3 if and only if λ1 = λ2 = 1, i.e. the two
firms exhibit no inertia. In this case, at a = 3 a degenerate bifurcation of
codimension 2 occurs at which the fixed point E1 ∈ ∆ is transformed from
stable node into unstable node and, simultaneously a pair of stable fixed
points are created in symmetric positions with respect to the diagonal ∆ and
a stable cycle of period 2 is created along the invariant diagonal ∆, as well.
So, after this bifurcation, three coexisting attractors are present, each with
its own basin of attraction (see fig. 1a, obtained with parameters λ1 = λ2 = 1
and a = 3.03 > ap). The particular ”rectangular shaped” structure of the
basins is a consequence of the fact that for λ1 = λ2 = 1 the map (6) assumes
the form (x′, y′) = T (x, y) = (f(y), g(x)), hence it maps horizontal lines
into vertical lines and vice-versa. The properties of attractors and basins of
these maps, characterized by the fact that T 2(x, y) = (f(g(x)), g(f(y))) is
uncoupled, are studied in [5].
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Instead, if λ1 = λ2 = λ < 1, i.e. the firms are homogeneous with the same
degree of inertia, the structure of attractors and basins is still symmetric
with respect to the invariant diagonal ∆, but with a more smooth shape.
Moreover, from (15) it follows that af > 3, i.e. af > ap. In this case, as the
parameter a crosses the bifurcation value ap, the fixed point E1 is transformed
from a stable node into a saddle point, with local stable set along the invariant
diagonal ∆, which becomes a boundary that separates the basin of the two
newly born stable nodes E2 and E3 (see the situation represented in fig. 1b,
obtained with λ = 0.9 and a = 3.3, i.e. 3 = ap < a < af = 3.4). If the
parameter a is further increased across the bifurcation value af , at which
the flip bifurcation occurs, the saddle point E1 gives rise to a saddle cycle of
period 2 with periodic points along ∆. As a is further increased this saddle
cycle gains transverse stability via a subcritical flip bifurcation and this leads
to the dynamic scenario represented in fig. 1c, obtained with λ = 0.9 and
a = 3.7. So, at this stage we have again three coexisting attractors, one
along ∆ (a cycle of period 2) and two steady states in symmetric positions
with respect to ∆, each with its own basin of attraction, represented by
different gray shades in fig.1. Notice that the basins are non connected sets,
a phenomenon that can only be observed with noninvertible maps.
With the same parameters λi, i = 1, 2, the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation
occurs at ah ' 3.71, according to (16) of Proposition 1, and the two fixed
points E2 and E3 become unstable focuses, and they are surrounded by
stable closed invariant curves along which quasi-periodic motion occurs. This
numerically proves that the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation is supercritical (see
fig. 1d).
It is worth to notice that, from (16) we have ah ≥ 3.645, as
(
1
λ1
+ 1
λ2
)
≥ 2
and being ah increasing with
(
1
λ1
+ 1
λ2
)
.
Up to now we have only been concerned with the time evolution of mar-
keting efforts x1(t) and x2(t) of the two firms, related to the rescaled dynamic
variables x(t) and y(t) by (5). However, it is also important to consider the
time evolution of profits as well. If a1 = a2 = a then the condition (10),
equivalent to Π1 > Π2, becomes
(x− y) (x+ y − a2) < 0, (19)
i.e. the hyperbola G(x, y) = 0 degenerates into the pair of orthogonal lines
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1: Panel (a): λ1 = λ2 = 1 and a = 3.03 > ap, just after the codimension 2 bifurcation at
which simultaneous flip and pitchfork bifurcations occur. Panel (b): λ1 = λ2 = 0.9 and a = 3.3, just
after the pitchfork bifurcation: 3 = ap < a < af = 3.4. Panel (c): λ1 = λ2 = 0.9 and a = 3.7, just
after the subcritcal flip bifurcation of the cycle of period 2 along the diagonal. Panel (d): λ1 = λ2 = 0.9
and a = 3.72, just after the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation of equilibrium points E2, E3, being ah = 3.71.
The different gray shades represent basins of attraction, wherease the black region represents the initial
conditions that generate unfeasible trajectories, i.e. involving negative values of the dynamic variables.
y = x and y = −x+ a2, crossing at (xc, yc) =
(
a2
2
, a
2
2
)
, that divide the phase
space into four sectors such that Π1 > Π2 in the two sectors above both
lines and below both lines, and Π1 < Π2 in the other two sectors. At the
equilibrium E1, being x = y, the two firms have the same profits, whereas for
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a > 3 at the two equilibrium points E2 and E3 the inequalities Π1 > Π2 and
Π1 < Π2 hold respectively. In fact, at E2 and E3 we have x+ y =
a2
a2−1 < a
2,
so it is easy to realize that at the equilibrium E2, characterized by x > y
(i.e. firm 1 spends more in marketing efforts) we have Π1 > Π2, i.e. firm 1
makes more profits, and vice-versa in the equilibrium E3. Similar situations
are obtained in the case of more complex attractors, located around these
equilibria when they are unstable, in the sense that Π1 > Π2 when the
dynamics occur along attractors located in the region with x > y (i.e. below
the diagonal ∆) and vice-versa for attractors in the region x < y (above the
diagonal ∆). In fact, for a > 3 the line x+y = a2 is outside the region where
the asymptotic dynamics of the model take place, so that only the first factor
in (19) determines the difference between the two profits. Instead, in the case
of attractors that include both regions with x > y and x < y, time periods
with Π1 > Π2 alternate with time periods with Π1 < Π2.
This occurs, for example, in the case of homogeneous firms when the
coexisting chaotic attractors created around the unstable equilibrium points
E2 and E3 merge and form a unique large chaotic attractor, as shown in fig.
2. In the left panel (fig. 2a) when the asymptotic motion occurs along the
attractor surrounding the equilibrium E2 then firm 1 makes more profits, and
vice-versa for the trajectories converging to the upper attractor around E3.
After the contact between the two attractors along the diagonal ∆, occurring
for increasing values of a, the motion along the unique large attractor is
characterized by alternating time periods with higher profit for one firm or
the other one.
However, as stated in the Introduction, in this paper we are mainly inter-
ested to study the cases of heterogeneous firms. We start by discussing the
effects of different inertia, i.e. λ1 6= λ2. In this case the diagonal is no longer
invariant, i.e. x = y in (6) does not imply x′ = y′. This has a remarkable
effect on the shape of the basins, as shown in fig. 3a, obtained with λ1 = 0.5
and λ2 = 0.7 (i.e. firm 1 has more inertia in revising efforts than firm 2) and
a = 4, i.e. just after the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation of E2 and E3. In this
case the stable set of the saddle point E1, which constitutes the boundary
that separates the two basins of attraction, is folded so that the basin of the
attractor below the diagonal, where firm 1 makes more profits, is smaller.
Notice that firm 1 is the one with more inertia. In the situation shown in
fig. 3b, obtained again for a = 4 but with λ1 = 0.7 and λ2 = 1 (firm 2
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Panel (a): for λ1 = λ2 = 0.8 and a = 4.05 two chaotic attractors coexist each with its own
basin of attraction. Panel (b): for λ1 = λ2 = 0.8 and a = 4.0565 a unique symmetric chaotic attractor
exists.
exhibit no inertia, i.e. it moves directly to the computed best reply market-
ing effort) the two attractors become chaotic, and the basin of attraction of
the one surrounding E2 (characterized by higher profits of firm 1) shrinks
further. As it can be seen in fig. 3b, the chaotic attractor around E2 is quite
close to the basin boundary. Indeed, if λ1 is slightly increased, then such a
contact occurs, leading to the disappearance of the chaotic attractor around
E2, a global (or contact) bifurcation known as “final bifurcation” (see [22])
or “boundary crisis” (see [17]). After this contact bifurcation the generic
trajectory goes to the chaotic attractor around E3 (see fig. 3c, obtained with
λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 1 and a = 4). The former chaotic attractor around E2 is
transformed into a chaotic repellor, formed by the dense and unstable set of
periodic points that constituted the skeleton of the just disappeared attrac-
tor: such chaotic repellor is often denoted as the “ghost” of the attractor,
and its presence gives rise to long chaotic transients along the former chaotic
attractor before the generic trajectory reaches the other attracting set (now
globally attracting).
In the dynamic scenarios shown in figures 3a,b, as well as those in fig.1,
the feature of non connected basins of attraction is quite evident, a property
specific to noninvertible maps which is very important in applications, as it
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: Panel (a): λ1 = 0.5, λ2 = 0.7 and a = 4. Panel (b): λ1 = 0.7, λ2 = 1 and a = 4. Panel (c):
λ1 = 0.75, λ2 = 1 and a = 4. The white and the light gray in (a) and (b) represent the basins of the two
coexisting attractors, whereas in (c) the generic trajectory starting from an initial condition in the white
region enters the unique (chaotic) global attractor.
has a strong influence on path dependence. This property is now well known,
after the books [18] and [22], as well as many papers and books dealing with
applications, see e.g. [25], [4], [6], where the transition between connected and
non connected basins is explained in terms of the unfolding action of critical
curves. We give here just a short qualitative explanation, based on the fact
that in the context of noninvertible maps it is useful to define the immediate
basin B0(A), of an attracting set A, as the widest connected component of
the basin which contains A. Then the total basin can be expressed as
B (A) =
∞⋃
n=0
T−n(B0(A))
where T−n(x) represents the set of all the rank-n preimages of x, i.e. the
set of points which are mapped in x after n iterations of the map T . The
backward iteration of a noninvertible map repeatedly unfolds the phase space,
and this implies that the basins may be non-connected, i.e. formed by several
disjoint portions. As recalled at the end of Section 2, each branch of critical
curve LC = T (LC−1) separates regions of the phase plane characterized by
different numbers of preimages. So, if a portion of a basin, after a contact
with a critical curve, enters the region Zk characterized by a higher number
of preimages, then the extra preimages created after the contact may form a
nonconnected portion of the basin.
On the basis of these arguments, in fig. 4 we show how the creation
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of a nonconnected portion of a basin for the map (6) can be explained in
terms of a contact between the immediate basin and a branch of critical
curve LC = T (LC−1), where LC−1 is given by (13). In fig. 4a, obtained for
λ1 = 0.4 and λ2 = 0.6, with a = 3.2, the two equilibria E2 and E3 are stable
focuses, with the stable set of E1 that separates the two basins, represented
by light gray and white respectively. When λ1 is increased from 0.4 to 0.5 the
boundary of the light gray basin of E2 has a contact with LC and a portion of
it enters the region Z4. This gives rise to the creation of a new non connected
portion of the same basin, formed by the union of the two further preimages
merging along LC−1, of the portion of the basin that entered the region Z4
after the contact.
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Panel (a): λ1 = 0.4, λ2 = 0.6, a = 3.2. Panel (b): λ1 = 0.5 with the other parameters at the
same value as in (a).
To sum up, by tuning the different values of the inertia parameters λ1
and λ2, with a fixed common value of marketing effectiveness a, both the
kind of attractors and the structure of the basins can be strongly influenced.
In the next section we consider the further source of heterogeneity given by
different values of effort effectiveness a1 and a2.
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4. The general case
In this section we relax the assumption (14) of identical effort effective-
ness, so that the two firms can differ both for their effort effectiveness and
for their inertia.
Unfortunately the simple analytical expression of the fixed points ob-
tained in the previous section is lost, however we can give the following
general result concerning their existence.
Proposition 2.Besides E0 = (0, 0) a non vanishing fixed point always
exists in the region S = (0, 1)× (0, 1). If a1a2 6= 1 then two further distinct
fixed points exist in the region S if the following inequality holds
D(a1, a2) =
a21a
4
2
108 (1− a1a2)6
[
27 + a1a2 (4a1 + 4a2 − 18)− a21a22
]
< 0 (20)
and if D(a1, a2) = 0 these two further fixed points are merging, i.e. there
are two real coincident solutions of (8). In the particular case a1a2 = 1 the
unique fixed point E =
(
1
(a1+1)
2 ,
1
(a2+1)
2
)
is get.
Proof. The algebraic system (8), whose solutions are the fixed points of
the map (6), can be rewritten as{
ζ = 1−a1a2
a2
η2 + a1η
η
[
(1−a1a2)2
a1a2
η3 + 2 (1− a1a2) η2 + a2 (a1 + 1) η − a2
]
= 0
(21)
where η =
√
x and ζ =
√
y. The roots of the third degree polynomial inside
square brackets can be found by Cardano’s formula. In fact it can be written
as
ξ3 + pξ + q = 0
with ξ = η + 2a1a2
3(1−a1a2) and coefficients
p = a1a
2
2
3− a1
3 (1− a1a2)2
, q =
a1a2
27 (1− a1a2)3
(−27a2 + 9a1a22 − 2a21a22)
and the condition for the existance of three real solutions is given by D =
q2
4
+ p
3
27
< 0 (see e.g. [24]), that is readily transformed in the form (20). In
particular, if a2 = 1/a1 then the system (21){
ζ = a1η
η
a1
[(a1 + 1) η − 1] = 0
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from which the unique nonvanishing solution is η = 1
a1+1
, ζ = a1
a1+1
= 1
a2+1
,
and consequently x = η2 = 1
(a1+1)
2 , x = ζ2 =
1
(a2+1)
2 .
Finally, the fact that the real solutions (x, y) of (8) are inside the region
S follows easily from direct inspection of (8). In fact, if y < 0 then from the
second equation x cannot assume a real value, and analogously if x < 0 then
y cannot be real; if y > 1, then from the first equation x < 0, which is a
contradiction according to the argument given above.
The graph of D(a1, a2) = 0 in the parameters’ plane (a1, a2), shown in fig.
5, is symmetric with respect to the diagonal a1 = a2 as D(a1, a2) = D(a2, a1),
and is formed by two smooth branches joining at the cusp point located in
a1 = a2 = 3. If the two parameters are below the line a1 + a2 = 6 then only
one equilibrium can exist.
Figure 5: In the parameters’ plane (a1, a2) the region R1 (white), where one non trivial equilibrium
point exists, and the region R3 (light gray), where three non trivial equilibrium points exist, are shown.
R1 and R3 are bounded by the curve D(a2, a2) = 0. The dotted line is the curve a2 = a
−1
1 .
Notice that the particular case a1a2 = 1 corresponds to the duopoly model
with isoelastic demand proposed in [23] (see the Appendix). This model is
obtained only in a subset of zero measure in the parameters’ plane (a1, a2),
represented by the dotted curve in fig. 5, which is entirely included inside
the region R1 with only one equilibrium.
If the values of the parameters a1 and a2 are allowed to change in the
portion of the parameters’ plane with a1 + a2 > 6 a saddle-node bifurcation
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occurs when a smooth branch of the curve D = 0 is crossed, i.e. two equi-
librium points are created as the branch is crossed towards the region R3
bounded by the two branches. Whenever the parameters (a1, a2) are located
along a branch of D = 0 two merging equilibria exist, that split inside the
region characterized by D(a1, a2) < 0 (denoted by R3 in fig. 5) giving rise to
a stable node and a saddle point, whose stable set represents the boundary
of the basin of the stable node. Instead, at the cusp point three merging
equilibria are obtained, and if the parameters (a1, a2) enter region R3 across
the cusp point (3, 3) then a pitchfork bifurcation occurs according to Propo-
sition 1. Three bifurcation diagrams are shown in fig. 6, obtained when the
parameters (a1, a2) are varied along the paths shown in the small pictures
reported inside. As it can be seen in panels (a) and (b) the saddle-node
bifurcations, at which pairs of equilibrium points are created or destroyed,
give rise to typical hysteresis effects. Instead, the bifurcation path shown in
panel (c), across the cusp point, gives rise to the typical pitchfork bifurcation
already discussed in the previous section.
Figure 6: Three bifurcation diagrams when the parameters (a1, a2) are varied along the paths shown
in the small pictures reported inside.
We end this section by some numerical explorations in order to discuss the
role of the parameters a1 and a2 on the dynamic scenarios of the model. Let
us first consider a sequence of numerical simulations obtained with identical
inertia parameters λ1 = λ2 = 0.8, starting from a simple dynamic situation,
obtained for a1 = 3.5 and a2 = 3, characterized by a unique globally stable
equilibrium, denoted by E3 = (0.196, 0.864) in fig. 7a. As a2 is increased
a couple of further equilibrium points, say E1 and E2, is created through a
saddle-node bifurcation, the stable set of the saddle E1 being the boundary
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that separates the basin of the two attracting equilibria E2 and E3. The
symmetric case with a1 = a2 = 3.5 is shown in fig. 7b. As the parame-
ter a2 is further increased, the equilibrium point E2 loses its stability via a
supercritical Neimark-Sacker bifurcation at which a stable closed invariant
curve is created, which is transformed into a chaotic attractor as a2 increases
more and more, see fig. 7c obtained with a2 = 4. If a2 is further increased
then the chaotic attractor enlarges until it has a contact with the boundary
that separates its basin with the set of unfeasible trajectories, i.e. the set of
points that generate trajectories involving negative values, existing outside
the phase space S = [0, 1] × [0, 1]. At this contact a final bifurcation (or
boundary crisis) occurs and, as already described in the previous section,
after this contact the generic trajectory starting outside the basin of E3, is
an interrupted path leading to negative values (one firm stops marketing ef-
forts, i.e. it exits the market) as shown in fig. 7d. To sum up, two contrasting
effects are obtained by increasing the effort effectiveness a2 of firm 2: it first
leads to the creation of a second attractor and then it leads to its destruction.
A similar effect is obtained when different levels of inertia are considered,
like in the sequence of numerical simulations shown in fig. 8 obtained with
λ1 = 0.9 and λ2 = 0.7. In this case the initial dynamic scenario, obtained
for a1 = 4 and a2 = 3, is given by the presence of a unique equilibrium, say
E3 = (0.12, 0.91), which is an unstable focus surrounded by a stable periodic
cycle of period 5 (five periodic points located along an invariant closed curve)
which is a global attractor, i.e. it attracts the generic initial condition in
the square S = [0, 1] × [0, 1]. As a2 increases, a saddle-node bifurcation
occurs at which the two equilibrium points E1 (saddle) and E2 (stable node)
are created, as shown in fig. 8b obtained with a2 = 3.4. Just after the
saddle-node bifurcation the basin of E2 is very small, being it bounded,
as usual, by the stable set of E1. However this basin, or the basin of the
attractor around the originary fixed point, enlarges more and more when
a2 is further increased, as shown in fig. 8c obtained for a2 = 3.8. This is
a remarkable global phenomenon, that cannot be revealed through a linear
approximations around the attracting sets, and can generally be detected by
computer-aided analysis. Also in this case, like in the sequence of numerical
simulations analyzed in fig. 7, as a2 is further increased the attractor around
the equilibrium E2 becomes chaotic, and its size increases until its has a
contact with the basin of unfeasible trajectories at which it disappears, i.e.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 7: λ1 = λ2 = 0.8, a1 = 3.5. In panel (a) a2 = 3; in (b) a2 = 3.5, in (c) a2 = 4; in (d)
a2 = 4.1. The white region is the basins of the upper attractor, the light gray region is the basin of the
lower attractor, whereas the black region represents the set of points that generate unfeasible trajectories
(i.e. entering the negative orthants).
it is transformed into a chaotic repellor that influences the chaotic transient
before the trajectories are interrupted.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the market share attraction model pro-
posed in [15] with just two firms competing in the market that decide their
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 8: λ1 = 0.9, λ2 = 0.7, a1 = 4. In panel (a) a2 = 3; in (b) a2 = 3.4; in (c) a2 = 3.8; in (d)
a2 = 4.05. The white region is the basins of the upper attractor, the light gray region is the basin of the
lower attractor, whereas the black region represents the set of points that generate unfeasible trajectories
(i.e. entering the negative orthants
own marketing efforts according to best reply with na¨ıve expectations, and we
have stressed the effects of heterogeneities between firms. Through analytical
results and numerical analysis, the role of heterogeneities on the existence,
stability and structure of the basins of attraction have been stressed. An
analytic study of the existence and stability properties of equilibrium points
has been given, showing how local and global bifurcations are influenced by
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differences in the parameters measuring inertia (or prudence) of firms, as well
as differences in the relative effectiveness of effort. In particular, it has been
shown that increasing inertia often leads, as expected, to more stability of
the steady states. However the basin of attraction of the attractor where the
profit of the firm with increasing inertia is higher shrinks, up to causing the
disappearance of the attractor through final bifurcations (or boundary crisis)
Similar phenomena occurs when the parameters that represent marketing ef-
forts effectiveness are increased. These parameters give rise to hysteresis
phenomena due to the occurrence of saddle node bifurcations at which cou-
ples of steady states are created or destroyed. Moreover, a gradual increase
of one of these effort efficiency parameters first cause the creation of a co-
existing attractors, and then its disappearance, when it becomes too large,
due to a contact bifurcation with the set of points that generate unfeasible
trajectories.
The global bifurcations leading to the creation of non connected basins
of attraction are discussed, and their meaning in terms of strong path de-
pendence is stressed. The role of heterogeneities has been stressed both in
stability properties and in the structure of the basins, as well as the relations
between symmetry properties and bifurcation scenarios. A global study of
the basins’ structure is crucial to forecast which firm will prevale in the
market in the sense of gaining higher profits. In fact, the dynamic complexi-
ties shown in our analysis include coexistence of attractors of different kinds
(steady states, periodic cycles, quasi-periodic and chaotic motions) on which
firms have different profits in the long run, with topologically complicated
structures of the basins, due to noninvertibility of the discrete dynamical
system. This gave us the possibility to stress how the discrete dynamical
system considered is quite interesting even from the mathematical point of
view. Moreover, the comparison with the (apparently) very similar model
proposed in [23] as a discrete-time model of a duopoly game with isoelastic
demand function, allowed us to stress that the latter is a quite particular sub-
class of the marketing model considered in this paper, and consequently the
dynamic scenarios analyzed in the marketing model considered in this paper
are much richer than the ones observed in the literature for that duopoly
game.
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6. Appendix
In this section, just for comparison and in order to make the paper more
self-consistent, we recall the map of the Cournot duopoly model proposed in
[23] and its main properties.
The map assumes the form
q′1 = (1− λ1) q1 + λ1
[√
q2
c1
− q2
]
(22)
y′ = (1− λ2) q2 + λ2
[√
q1
c2
− q1
]
where also in this case the parameters λi ∈ [0, 1] represent the attitude of
firm i to adopt the best reply, hence (1− λi) represents the inertia of firm
i, i = 1, 2, and ci > 0, i = 1, 2, represent unitary costs. The fixed points,
nonnegative solutions of the algebraic system
q1 =
√
q2
c1
− q2
q2 =
√
q1
c2
− q1
are the trivial oneE0 = (0, 0) and the unique positive solution E1 =
(
c2
(c1+c2)
2 ,
c1
(c1+c2)
2
)
.
The Jacobian matrix, computed at the fixed point E1, becomes
J(E1) =
 1− λ1 λ1
(
c1 + c2
2c1
− 1
)
λ2
(
c1 + c2
2c2
− 1
)
1− λ2

The coefficients of the characteristic equation
P (z) = z2 − Tr · z +Det = 0 ,
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are Tr = 2−λ1−λ2 andDet = (1− λ1) (1− λ2)−λ1λ2
(
a1 + a2
2a1
− 1
)
a1 + a2
2a2
−
1, hence the Schur conditions for stability become
P (1) =
λ1λ2 (c1 + c2)
2
4c1c2
> 0 for each ci > 0, λi ∈ (0, 1]
P (−1) = 8c1c2 (2− λ1 − λ2) + λ1λ2 (c1 + c2)2 > 0 for each ci > 0, λi ∈ (0, 1]
1−Det > 0 if (c1 + c2)
2
4c1c2
<
λ1 + λ2
λ1λ2
The third condition is always satisfied for c1 = c2 = c, whereas the equi-
librium may become unstable through a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation when
c1
c2
6= 1. In particular, without any inertia, i.e. λ1 = λ2 = 1, the unique
positive equilibrium is stable if and only if c1/c2 ∈ (3− 2
√
2, 3 + 2
√
2).
It is worth to notice that the map (22) is a particular case of (6) because
after the change of coordinates
x = c2q1 ; y = c1q2 (24)
the following map is obtained
x′ = (1− λ1)x+ aλ1
(√
y − y)
y′ = (1− λ2)y + 1aλ2 (
√
x− x)
where a = c2/c1. This is a particular case of (6) with a1 = a and a2 =
1
a
,
and this explains why the creation of further fixed points is not possible, as
explained in the remark after Proposition 2, Indeed, the unique equilibrium
E =
(
1
(a1+1)
2 ,
1
(a2+1)
2
)
existing in the particular case a1a2 = 1 corresponds to
E1 =
(
c2
(c1+c2)
2 ,
c1
(c1+c2)
2
)
by considering a1 = c2/c1, a2 = c1/c2, together with
(24). We refer to [1] and [2] for a deeper analysis of the same model.
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